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DOES THE USA PATRIOT ACT REQUIRE THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO ABANDON 
FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS IN THE NAME OF HOMELAND SECURITY?
Joan M. O’Sullivan-Butler
“‘Q: If al Qaeda incorporates in Delaware then its assets cannot be blocked?’
A: The people involved are not al Qaeda.’”
-- Exchange between U.S. Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and Frank Simmons, the attorney for 
Global Relief Foundation during oral argument1
According to findings by the International Monetary Fund, it is estimated that 
money laundering amounts to between approximately two to five percent of global gross 
domestic product or about $600 billion per year.2  In the aftermath of the events of 
September 11, 2001, it has become increasingly apparent that “money laundering, and the 
defects in financial transparency on which money laundering rely, are critical to 
financing global terrorism and providing funds for terrorist attacks.”3  The immediate 
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 within the United States was a wave of 
legislation, including the USA PATRIOT Act (the “Act”), which reshaped national 
security policies while simultaneously restricting traditional civil liberties.4   Among the 
many terrorism-related provisions of the Act, the executive branch was given authority to 
freeze the assets of organizations -- in which there is a foreign interest suspected of 
funding terrorist organizations – through the use of an asset blocking order pending a 
1 Government Defends Use of Secret Evidence Against Islamic Charity, FOXNews.com, 
October 29, 2002, available at <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,67010,00.html>
2 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 
codified at 50 U.S.C. 1702 et seq. (2001).
3 See id. § 302(a)(2).
4 See John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting ‘Enduring Freedom’ for 
‘Homeland Security’: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice 
Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (August 2002).
2further investigation.  The Act further permits the use of classified information which will 
be subjected to only ex parte, in camera inspection by the judge presiding over a 
challenge to such an action as a means of supporting the government’s actions in freezing 
such assets.  
While the use of secret evidence is normally something to be avoided, federal law 
currently allows its use in exceptional cases.  Asset-blocking cases such as Global Relief 
Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neil et al., the governm ent has argued, represent precisely some of 
those “exceptional circumstances” when secret evidence must be permitted.5
Furthermore, the government argues: “[t]he ongoing efforts to identify foreign terrorists 
and their supporters depends in part on the use of intelligence that, if disclosed, could 
cause grave damage to the national security of the United States.”6  Recently, however, 
the use of this secret evidence has been challenged by the parties affected by such 
blocking orders as an unconstitutional action that frequently leaves their own attorneys 
“working in the dark” and unable to effectively challenge the government’s allegations.7
Further, recent efforts by some members of Congress to make the USA PATRIOT 
Act permanent, and even increase the government’s powers of domestic intelligence 
gathering, surveillance and prosecution are a source of concern within both the 
government and the private sector.8  The PATRIOT II, or the “Domestic Security 
5 Government Defends Use of Secret Evidence Against Islamic Charity, supra note 1.  
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 See Christian Bourge, Analysts Worry about Patriot Act II, WASH. TIMES, March 10, 
2003; Eric Lichtblau, Republicans Want Terror Law Made Permanent, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 
2003. The proposed legislation includes a provision which expands the definition of foreign 
power under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) to include individuals 
unaffiliated with a particular terrorist group who engage in terrorism.  As a result, the law would 
then permit investigations of “lone wolf” terrorists or “sleeper cells” which may not currently be 
authorized under FISA.  See Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003: Section-By-Section 
3Enhancement Act of 2003” as the draft legislation is more formally known, would make 
permanent many of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act which were initially subject 
to a sunset provision in 2005 when the legislation was initially approved.9  However, 
many congressional Democrats and civil rights activists alike have indicated their 
increasing frustration with the lack of information from the Justice Department on 
whether or not those powers have been abused.10
The main question, therefore, in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11 and 
the US government’s attempt to combat money laundering as a source of potential 
terrorist funding, is whether the government’s use of secret evidence to justify a 
challenged blocking order represents a violation of the fundamental due process rights of 
the aggrieved party.  In an attempt to evaluate this issue, the remainder of this essay is 
divided into four Parts.  Part I provides an overview of the connection between money 
laundering and terrorism.  Part II describes the statutory history and legislative 
Analysis, at 1, available at <http: www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf> (last visited April 
23, 2003). The legislation would also require the court to permit the government to automatically 
make in camera ex parte applications to the court particularly for the use of ex parte evidence 
when classified information is involved.  See id.
However, perhaps the most contentious provision in the legislation would: (1) permit the 
government to collect DNA from suspected terrorists or other individuals involved in terrorists 
investigations; and (2) provide the government with the power to revoke the citizenship of 
naturalized citizens suspected of terrorist activities or providing “material support” to terrorists. 
See Bourge, supra note 8. 
9 See Bourge, supra note 8.
10 See id. For instance, it is well-documented that after Congress passed the USA 
PATRIOT Act, the use of FISA warrants has increased exponentially.  See Anita Ramasastry, 
Recent Oregon Ruling on Secret Warrants May Set Troublesome Precedent, available at
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/18/findlaw.analysis.ramasastry.warrant> (last visited April 
24, 2003).  This increase has been perceived to be the result of changes enacted by the PATRIOT 
Act which requires the government to pass a much more lenient test prior to the issuance of a 
FISA warrant.  See id.  Prior to the PATRIOT Act, the law required that “the purpose” of a secret 
FISA warrant must be counterintelligence.  See id.  Now, however, intelligence gathering can be 
merely “a significant purpose” of the issuance of such a warrant.  See id.  Some critics contend 
that this amendment opens the way to the issuance of “dual purpose” warrants as an end run 
4background to the money laundering provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, as well as 
how the Act’s provisions raise due process concerns in the context of judicial 
proceedings challenging a blocking order issued by the US government.  Part III 
examines the rapidly developing body of legal precedent emerging from recent 
challenges to such blocking orders and the Government’s efforts to enforce such orders 
through the submission of “confidential and sensitive” evidence on an ex parte, in 
camera basis.  Part IV examines the legal and public policy arguments, both in favor of 
and against the continued use of such ex parte, in camera evidence as a part of judicial 
proceedings challenging blocking orders as well as some of the potential ramifications of 
such a course of action.  What emerges from this analysis is the determination that while 
the provisions of the Act relating to the ex parte, in camera submission of evidence 
supporting the government’s allegations are alarming at first glance, the ultimate goal of 
cracking down on money laundering as an increasingly potent source of terrorist 
financing can only be supported by broad enforcement capabilities held in check by the 
unbiased members of the judiciary.  
I. The Money Laundering and Terrorism Connection
In the United States, money laundering is defined as a series of legitimate or 
illegitimate financial transactions used to disguise the source of illicit funds.  Money 
laundering includes the use of legitimate funds to facilitate a criminal activity, such as 
terrorism.11  The volume of global money laundering is estimated at roughly $590 billion 
around the Fourth Amendment in the regular law enforcement context while the public remains 
largely in the dark about every aspect of FISA warrants.  See id.
11 See Robert E. Sims, Money Laundering and Corruption: Enforcement After September 
11th, Presentation to American Bar Association Center for Continuing Legal Education (March 
21-22, 2002).  
5to $1.5 trillion per year.12  The primary source of these laundered funds worldwide is 
drug trafficking and financial crimes, such as bank fraud and credit card fraud.  Money 
laundering also supports a wide array of other criminal activities such as terrorism and 
arms trafficking.13  As an activity that involves such a staggering amount of money, 
money laundering poses a significant threat to national security and poses major foreign 
policy risks.  The potentially hazardous effects of money laundering include the 
facilitation of official corruption, the distortion of markets and the destabilization of the 
economies of developing countries.14
Money laundering that occurs in connection with terrorism poses unique 
challenges.  First, it should be noted that there are several similarities between terrorist 
groups and organized crimes.  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the leading 
international anti-money laundering organization, recently reported that terrorist 
organizations rely on the same sources of funding that organized crime groups utilize, 
such as drug trafficking, fraud, extortion and kidnapping, and likewise utilize similar 
methods to launder funds, such as nominee accounts, shell companies and numbered 
bank accounts.15
However, there are also some important distinctions between terrorist groups and 
individuals involved in organized crime.  Terrorists do not generally pursue financial 
goals.  Terrorists do not consider the generation of revenue as one of their main goals and 
usually do not attempt to launder substantial sums of money or engage in traditionally 
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See Nicole M. Healy, The Impact of September 11th on Anti-Money Laundering Efforts 
and the European Union and the Commonwealth Gatekeeper Initiatives, 36 Int’l. Law. 733 
(Summer 2000).
6suspicious transactions.16  For example, the terrorists who carried out the World Trade 
Center attacks required only approximately $500,000 in funding.17  Furthermore, the 
efforts to fund those individuals involved only one transaction that generated a suspicious 
activity report.18
Funds used for terrorism are difficult to detect for a number of reasons.  First, 
terrorists frequently utilize underground banking systems available in certain countries.19
Second, the funds used to support these individuals are not large amounts of money and 
may include superficially legitimate sources of funding such as charitable organizations 
and legitimate businesses.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation has identified the funding 
of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hamas through charitable organizations 
as a “significant challenge to law enforcement” and has therefore made such 
organizations a prime focus of terrorist financial investigations. 20 According to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), such organizations offer terrorists “logistical 
support in the form of cover employment, false documentation, travel facilitation, and 
training.”21  As many critics of the PATRIOT Act point out, the “line is often blurred” 
between terrorist fund-raising and legitimate fund-raising.22  Nevertheless, even those 
efforts which appear on the surface to “help the poor” may fall squarely into the realm of 
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 See Financing Patterns Associated with Al Qaeda: Statement for the Record Before the 
House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Feb. 12, 
2002 (statement of Dennis M. Lormel, Chief, Financial Crimes Section, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation), available at <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/lormel021202.htm>.   
21 Id.
22 See id.
7logistical support for terrorist activity.23 As a result, any successful attempt to combat 
money laundering as a source of terrorist funding necessarily requires broader 
enforcement capabilities than those efforts used to combat typical money laundering 
schemes.
II. USA PATRIOT Act: Statutory Framework and Legislative History
Current efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist funding are best 
understood in the context of historical development of the presidential powers over 
foreign affairs. 
A. Early History and the Trading with the Enemy Act
The source of the President’s power over foreign affairs, and hence the ability to 
combat global money laundering, is a long-standing issue since no explicit presidential 
affairs power is written in the Constitution.  Instead, the power over foreign affairs is 
deemed to be an inherent power of the President in his role of Commander in Chief.  In 
an effort to strengthen the President’s foreign affairs powers, the United States Congress 
enacted legislation empowering the President with broad authority to deal with foreign 
sovereigns in times of war and national emergency.  This early legislation was the 
Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”) as enacted in 1917 and amended in 1933.  The 
TWEA granted the President authority to “investigate, regulate … prevent or prohibit 
…transactions” in times of war or national emergency.24  The TWEA employed the use 
of economic sanctions as its primary tool to deal with foreign affairs.  
23 See id.
24 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 672 (1981).
8Of the several early cases addressing the President’s foreign affairs power, 
perhaps the most famous is United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation.25  In 
Curtis-Wright, a joint Congressional resolution authorizing the President to ban the sale 
of arms to countries engaged in a Bolivian conflict was challenged as an 
unconstitutionally broad delegation of legislative power to the president.  In upholding 
the resolution, the court reasoned that “it is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of 
our international relations, embarrassment, perhaps serious embarrassment, is to be 
avoided and success for our aim achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made 
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord 
to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which 
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”26  However, as the need 
for more extensive foreign policy powers increased, in times of peace as well as in times 
of war, the need for more in depth legislation to address the scope of the President’s 
authority became apparent.
B. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act
In 1977, Congress amended the TWEA and enacted the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) to delineate the President’s exercise of emergency 
economic powers in response to both wartime and peacetime crises.  The TWEA 
specifically governed “the President’s authority to regulate international economic 
transactions during wars or national emergencies.”27  The 1977 legislation granted the 
President broad emergency powers in wartime under the TWEA, and granted similar 
although not identical emergency economic powers in peacetime national emergencies 
25 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
26 See id.
9under the IEEPA.28  More specifically, following the declaration of a national emergency, 
the IEEPA provides the President with the authorization to:
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or 
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, 
withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, 
or exercising any right, power or privilege with respect to, or 
transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a 
national thereof has any interest…by any person, or with respect to 
any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.29
In essence, the IEEPA granted the President nearly complete but temporary 
authority to control the actions of any economic actor subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States in the event of a national emergency. 
C. Post-September 11 Action: Executive Order 13224
On September 24, 2002, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 
13224, declaring a national emergency with respect to the “grave acts of terrorism and 
threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists . . . and the immediate threat of 
further attacks on United States nationals or the United States.”30  The Executive Order 
specifically noted that “because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial 
foundation of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for those foreign 
persons that support or otherwise associate with these foreign terrorists.”31  More 
importantly, however, “because of the ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously, 
prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to this order would render 
these measures ineffectual. . . . [F]or these measures to be effective in addressing the 
27 See S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.N. 4540, 4541.
28 See id.
29 See 50 U.S.C. §1702(a)(1)(b) (West 2001).
30 See Exec. Order No. 13224  (Sept. 24, 2002).
31 Id.
10
national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior notice of a listing or 
determination made pursuant to this order.”32
Executive Order 13224 was not the first executive order directed towards 
combating money laundering as a source of terrorist funding.  For instance, on January 
25, 1995, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12947 in an effort to crack down on 
funding to the Islamic Resistance movement, more commonly known as “Hamas.” 33
That Order blocked all property and interests in property of the terrorist organization and 
persons designated in the Order.34  The Order also permitted the Secretary of the 
Treasury to designate additional individuals if they are found to be “owned or controlled 
by, or to act for or on behalf of” an entity designated in the Order.35
However, Executive Order 13224 represents the broadest definition of what 
constitutes the money laundering used to fund terrorist efforts.  Under the Executive 
Order, the President invoked the IEEPA to name twenty-seven terrorists, terrorist 
organizations and their supporters, and froze their assets that were in the United States, 
that would be coming into the United States, or that were in the “possession or control” 
of U.S. persons.36  The order also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to designate 
individuals or entities whose property or property interests should be blocked because 
they “act for or on behalf of” or are “owned or controlled by” designated terrorists or they 
“assist in, sponsor, or provide…support for” or are associated with them.37  The order 
32 Id. at § 10.    
33 See Exec. Order No. 12947 (Jan. 25, 1995).  
34 See Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note 30. 
35 See id.
36 See id.
37 See id.
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thereby expanded the definition of what actions constitute money laundering used to fund 
terrorist efforts to include any act which could be broadly construed to constitute 
assisting, sponsoring or providing support for terrorist groups.38  This broad definition of 
what constitutes money laundering used to fund terrorist efforts also carried over to the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act.  
D. The USA PATRIOT Act
In a more formal response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, also known as the USA 
PATRIOT Act.39  Passed in October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act significantly expands 
the President’s power under the IEEPA.  Previously, an individual or entity whose assets 
had been blocked could follow a procedure through which they were entitled to seek 
reconsideration of the blocking order if the party believed the order had been issued in 
error.  However, the USA PATRIOT Act provides that in cases of judicial review of a 
blocking order entered pursuant to the IEEPA, any classified information upon which the 
order was based “may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.”40
The new statutory framework enacted after September 11th focuses not only on 
the blocking of questionable assets, but also on the global problem of money laundering 
and how money laundering schemes are used by terrorists and their supporters.  Due to 
the “pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation of foreign terrorists,” 
Executive Order 13224 instructed the executive agencies of the United States to utilize all 
38 See id.
39 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, codified at 50 U.S.C. 1702 et 
seq.
40 See 50 U.S.C. §1702(c), as added by 115 Stat. at 278. 
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legal means to stem the flow of money supporting terrorist organizations throughout the 
world.41
The statutory framework of the USA PATRIOT Act provides further support for 
this firm mandate and makes significant changes in the fight against money laundering.  
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act, the “International Money Laundering Abatement and 
Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001” was signed into law on October 26, 2001.42  The 
purpose of Title III is to “increase the strength of United States measures to prevent, 
detect, and prosecute international money laundering and the financing of terrorism.”43
Title III requires the Secretary of the Treasury to implement numerous changes and 
triggers new compliance requirements for financial institutions, large corporations, 
charities, non-governmental organizations and even attorneys.44  In particular, Title III 
41 See id.
42 See USA PATRIOT Act, at 115 Stat. 296-342.  
43 See USA PATRIOT Act, §302(b)(1), at 115 Stat.  296-342.
44 For instance, Title III of the USA Patriot Act requires a reassessment of existing 
compliance programs for both financial and non-banking institutions. Corporations and 
government entities such as General Electric, Boeing, General Motors, and the US Postal Service 
are implementing “Know Your Customer” procedures requiring all employees to be in 
compliance with money laundering laws, to look for suspicious activities and to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that the businesses do not accept forms of payment identified as a means of 
laundering money.  See Sims, supra note 11.
The new anti-money laundering laws present challenges to attorneys and the legal 
profession. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) which consists of 29 countries and two 
international organizations, established what is known as the “Gatekeeper Initiative” which 
provides steps that attorneys should take in connection with business and financial transactions in 
order to prevent money laundering. The requirements of the Gatekeeper Initiative could seriously 
impact the legal profession and the existence of attorney-client privilege by requiring mandatory 
reporting obligations enforced by criminal penalties and a “no-tipping rule.” This reporting 
requirement could result in over reporting of innocent conduct to government authorities, or of 
attorneys refusing to take bona fide clients for fear of undefined risks.  See Edward J. Krauland 
and Stephane Lagonico, Lawyers and Anti-Money-Laundering: The Gatekeeper Initiative,
International Law News, Fall 2000, at 18-19.
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sets new conditions to do business in the United States for foreign financial institutions 
with assets in the United States.45
Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act represents Congress’ focus on the necessity of 
developing strategies to fight domestic and international money laundering, and in doing 
so expands the ability of law enforcement authorities to fight money laundering. For the 
first time, the law gives the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) access to Suspicious 
Activity Reports (“SARs”), including those involving bank accounts of U.S. citizens.46
Congress was particularly concerned with weaker foreign countries that allow the use of 
anonymous offshore banking facilities and the illicit movement of funds that are normally 
used in organized crime, smuggling, and terrorism. Congress was also concerned with the 
use of private and correspondent banking services to move illicit funds.47
Title III addresses Congress’s concerns by expanding the U.S. anti-money 
laundering laws in three main areas.  First, the law expands the list of crimes that may be 
used to serve as predicate offenses for money laundering crimes. Predicate offenses now 
include additional Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate 
offenses,48 foreign crimes, including all crimes of violence, foreign public corruption, 
offenses for with the United States would be required to extradite the offender,49
operation of an illegal money remission business,50 and bulk cash smuggling in amounts 
greater than $10,000 into or out of the United States.51
45 See 31 U.S.C. §5318A(b). 
46 See Sims, supra note 11.
47 See Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, at § 302(a)(6) and (7). 
48 See 18 U.S.C. § 232b(g)(5)(B).
49 See 18 U.S.C. §1956(c)(7)B)
50 See 18 U.S.C. §1960.
51 See 31 U.S.C. § 5332.
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Second, the Act focuses attention on U.S. financial institutions which are now 
required to take “special measures” when dealing with foreign countries or institutions 
that are considered to be of “primary money laundering concern.”52  U.S. financial 
institutions are now required to strictly regulate the relationships between U.S. 
institutions and foreign banks and individuals and to develop compliance programs to 
enable such action to take place.53 Title III further requires banks to conduct enhanced 
due diligence measures for private banking and correspondence accounts54 and prohibits 
United States banks from maintaining correspondent accounts with foreign “shell 
banks.”55
Finally, the Act expands the procedural tools that can be used by federal courts 
and law enforcement in prosecuting money laundering crimes.  In particular, the 2001 
Money Laundering Act expands the federal government’s authority for asset forfeiture.56
A new provision, Title 18, Section 981, expands the federal government’s forfeiture 
authority by allowing the civil forfeiture of any person, entity or any property engaged in 
terrorism.57  Specifically the provision authorizes the forfeiture of any property 
“affording any person a source of influence over such entity or organization” where the 
assets or property were “acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and for the 
purpose of supporting, planning, conducting or concealing” an act of terrorism against 
52 See 31 U.S.C. §5318A(b)(1-5). The special measures include the record keeping and 
reporting of certain financial transactions.  See id.
53 See John Gibault, Show the Money: The Anti-Terrorism Laws Target Money Laundering, 
Forcing Banks to be More Vigilant and Compliance Officers to Take on More Tasks, ABA 
JOURNAL, Jan. 2002, at 47-48. See also USA PATRIOT ACT §312(a)(i)(1). 
54 See 31 U.S.C. §5318(j). 
55 Shell banks, which owe their existence to the internet age, are banks that have no 
physical presence anywhere, and are not subject to regulation by any country. See 31 U.S.C. 
§5318(j).
56 See Healy, supra note 15, at 736. 
15
U.S. persons or property, or which were “derived from, involved in, or used or intended 
to be used” to commit such acts.58  The government can also forfeit the property of an 
individual convicted of an international terrorism offense and the proceeds or 
instrumentalities used to commit the predicate money laundering offense.59
Although the changes to the U.S. money laundering laws are significant, Title III 
may not fully address some of the most difficult issues in the fight against money 
laundering, namely informal financial transactions.  Since September 11, the role of 
informal financial transactions and their significance on the funding of terrorism has 
received major attention.  One of the major areas under scrutiny is the use of charitable 
organizations as a way to launder money and fund terrorist groups.  The Bush 
Administration has consistently expanded the scope of its Executive Orders to include 
charitable organizations and other controversial targets.60  The plethora of charitable 
organizations and other groups with contacts in the Middle East and third world 
countries, both those attempting to provide genuine humanitarian aid and those with less 
noble motives, create enormous potential for mistaken identities which could lead to 
mistaken seizures and asset blocking under the new laws.  As a result, a number of 
57 See id.
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G).
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c).  Title III also expands the government’s procedural authority.  
The Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury may issue a summons to obtain foreign 
bank records by serving the institution’s designated representative in the United States. See 31 
U.S.C. §5318(k).  By filing a civil action against the equal amount deposited in the corresponding 
United States bank account, the government can seek to forfeit funds deposited in an overseas 
bank. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(k).  Congress expanded the venue for money laundering claims under 
Title 18 to permit claims to be brought in any district where the defendant participated in moving 
the funds.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i).  Jurisdiction is expanded to anywhere a financial transaction 
occurred in the United States, where a U.S. court issues a forfeiture order or where the foreign 
individual converts the funds or maintains a bank account in the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(b)(2). 
60 See Sims, supra note 11. 
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organizations have raised questions about whether the new laws violate an affected 
party’s fundamental due process rights.  
III. Due Process and the USA PATRIOT Act in Action
Lawsuits filed by three such organizations are particularly instructive regarding 
the constitutionality of the government’s use of secret evidence in terrorist-funding cases.  
In December 2001, the Treasury Department froze the assets of two Chicago-based 
charities, Global Relief Foundation and Benevolence International Foundation, due to 
their suspected terrorist links.61  Notably, unlike other individuals who were officially 
designated as supporters of terrorism and then subjected to financial sanctions, the assets 
of both Global Relief Foundation and Benevolence International Foundation were frozen 
pending the government’s investigation of their potential terrorist links.62  The Treasury 
Department similarly froze the assets of Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development based on the group’s alleged support of Hamas, a Palestinian militant 
organization.63  As discussed more fully below, all three groups subsequently denied any 
terrorist ties and filed federal lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the 
government’s actions.      
A. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft et al.
On March 11, 2002, Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (“Holy 
Land”) filed a suit against John Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Attorney General of 
the United States of America, and several other high-ranking government officials 
61 See Geoff Dougherty and Laurie Cohen, U.S. Using New Law on Secret Evidence, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, March 15, 2002.
62 See id.
63 See id.
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challenging the government’s designation of Holy Land as a terrorist organization.64  The 
lawsuit also challenged the blocking of Holy Land’s assets by the government as 
unconstitutional.65  Holy Land was started in 1989 as a non-profit charitable corporation 
with its headquarters in Richardson, Texas.  Shukri Abu Baker, Holy Land’s Chief 
Executive Officer and co-founder, has dedicated the organization that provides 
humanitarian aid throughout the world, with its primary focus as the provision of aid to 
the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza areas.66
On December 4, 2001, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Asset Control (“OFAC”) designated Holy Land as a specially designated terrorist 
organization and blocked all of Holy Land’s assets pursuant to the IEEPA.67  Holy Land 
was so designated because of acts the organization had undertaken “for or on behalf of” 
Hamas, a radical Palestinian group.  The evidence on the record demonstrated that Holy 
Land had early financial connections to Hamas, that Holy Land met with Hamas leaders, 
funded Hamas controlled entities, and provided support to orphans of Hamas and to 
families of Hamas martyrs and prisoners. In addition, unidentified FBI informant reports 
showed that Holy Land funded Hamas.68
Holy Land subsequently filed a lawsuit against the government seeking to enjoin 
the government from continuing to block or otherwise interfere with the organization’s 
64 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F.Supp.2d 57 (2002).  
Holy Land filed suite not only against John Ashcroft, but also the United States Department of 
Justice, Secretary of the Treasury, Paul H. O’Neil, the United States Department of the Treasury, 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the United States Department of State.  See id.
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 64.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 69.
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access to, or disposition of, its assets.69  Holy Land alleged that the blocking of its assets 
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the First, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).  
Holy Land also alleged that the evidence submitted by the government did not support 
OFAC’s determination.70  On May 31, 2002, the government moved for summary 
judgment on the APA claim and moved to dismiss the remaining constitutional and 
RFRA claims.71  The government also filed a motion to submit classified evidence in 
camera and ex parte in support of their motions.  On August 8, 2002, the court ruled in 
favor of the government on all claims.72  Since that date, Holy Land has been effectively 
shut down and ceased its operations. 
B. Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neill et al.
Global Relief Foundation, Inc. (“Global Relief”) is an Islamic humanitarian relief 
organization and a domestic, non-profit corporation headquartered in Illinois that began 
operating in 1992.  Global Relief claims it is also the largest U.S.-based Islamic 
charitable organization with active programs in distributing food, funding schools and 
orphanages, and providing medical service throughout the Middle East and Europe.73
Over ninety percent of Global Relief’s donations are sent overseas to fund charitable 
activities.  In order to distribute the humanitarian aid abroad, Global Relief has 
established offices in Belgium, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan.74
69 See id. at 64.
70 See id.
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 62.
73 See Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neil, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D.Ill.).
74 See id
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Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, then-acting Deputy Attorney 
General Larry D. Thompson authorized the search of Global Relief’s Illinois office and 
the residence of its executive director, Mohammed Chehade.  On December 14, 2001, the 
FBI’s Chicago Division Joint Terrorism Task Force searched Global Relief’s offices and 
the executive director’s home.75  The items seized in these searches included records, 
computers, cellular phones, a credit card imprinter, receipts, palm pilots, and both US and 
foreign currency.76
Simultaneously on December 14, 2001, the Department of the Treasury’s Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued a “Blocking Notice and Requirement to 
Furnish Information” with respect to Global Relief pursuant to the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).77  The notice blocked the funds, accounts 
and business records of Global Relief pending the FBI’s further investigation into the 
possible relationship that Global Relief may have to the World Trade Center attacks and 
the Al Qaeda network.78  OFAC asserted that its actions were based on substantial 
amounts of classified and unclassified information relating to Global Relief’s possible 
connections with terrorist cells.79
On January 28, 2002, Global Relief filed a Petition for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief and for a Writ of Mandamus naming high-ranking government officials as the 
defendants.80  Global Relief’s Petition challenged the constitutionality of the 
government’s actions blocking Global Relief’s assets pursuant to the IEEPA and 
75 See id. at 2. 
76 See id. at 2.  
77 See id. at 3
78 See id
79 See id.
80 See id at 1. 
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requested that the government be ordered to “unfreeze” its assets and return the items 
seized in the FBI’s search.81  Two weeks later, Global Relief filed a motion for a 
preliminary injunction that argued that the temporary freezing of assets was 
unconstitutional and unlawful.82  The government replied by asking the court to deny 
Global Relief’s motions and to grant the government’s motion to submit ex parte, in 
camera evidence in support of its actions.83  Among the evidence the government sought 
to present in secret were records presented to OFAC that led to the freezing of Global 
Relief’s assets and the application for a search warrant for Global Relief’s headquarters.84
The court ruled in favor of the government on all counts.  The court found that the 
IEEPA, as modified by the USA Patriot Act, Section 1702(a)(1)(B) permits the President 
to “block during the pendency of an investigation…any acquisition, holding, 
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of … 
any right, power, or privilege with respect to any property in which any foreign country 
or a national thereof has any interest by any person…subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States.”85  It is clear, the court noted, that Congress intended for the President to 
have sweeping powers to regulate questionable property at the time of a national 
emergency.86  This power included the ability to block domestic assets of either a 
domestic corporation or a U.S. individual pending investigation when a foreign national 
or foreign country has an interest in those assets.87  As Global Relief is operated and 
controlled by foreign nationals, with foreign as well as domestic offices, and the 
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id
84 See Dougherty and Cohen, supra note 61.
85 See Global Relief, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
86 See id
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overwhelming majority of its charitable donations are for relief overseas, the court found 
that both foreign nationals and foreign countries have the most interest in this 
corporation.88  Based on the plain language of the IEEPA, the court found that OFAC’s 
Order blocking the assets as well as the search of the assets of Global Relief pending the 
FBI investigation was proper. 89  Notably, however, the Court did not cite to the USA 
PATRIOT Act as support for the government’s actions.90  Instead, the Court relied on the 
language of the IEEPA statute and pre-existing case law – and declined to address the 
constitutional issues raised by Global Relief’s challenge.91
C. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. v. Ashcroft, et al.
Finally, on January 30, 2002, Benevolence International Foundation 
(“Benevolence International”) filed a lawsuit against Ashcroft and a number of other 
high-ranking government officials92 in their official capacities challenging the 
government’s seizure of Benevolence International’s property.93  Founded in 1992, 
Benevolence International is a not-for-profit, charitable organization that has provided 
several millions of dollars worth of humanitarian aid to several countries around the 
world, including the United States.94  The organization’s charitable activities are often 
conducted in partnership with international relief organizations such as the United States 
87 See id. at 10.
88 See id
89 See id. at 11.
90 See Dougherty and Cohen, supra note 61.
91 See id.
92 See Complaint, Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. v. Ashcroft et al., Civ. No. 
02-C-0763 (N.D.Ill.) at ¶ 1 (“BIF Complaint”). BIF filed suit not only against John Ashcroft, but 
also Secretary of the Treasury, Paul H. O’Neill, Secretary of State, Colin Powell, Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Robert S. Mueller, and Richard Newcomb, Director of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control.  See id.  
93 See id.
94 See id. at ¶ 4. 
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Agency for International Development, the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees, the United Nations World Food Programs, and the United Nations 
International Children’s Emergency Fund.95
On December 14, 2001, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued Benevolence International a notice that the government 
had reason to believe that Benevolence International was engaged in activities in 
violation of the IEEPA.96  The letter further notified Benevolence International that the 
government was blocking all of Benevolence International’s funds, accounts and business 
records pending further investigation.97  On that same date, the FBI searched 
Benevolence International’s offices in Palos Hills, Illinois and Newark, New Jersey.  
These searches resulted in the seizure of all of Benevolence International’s financial 
records, as well as other documents and personal property.98  A separate, but related 
search was conducted that same day at the home of Benevolence International’s Chief 
Executive Officer, Enaam Arnaout.  During this search, a number of personal effects 
were seized including family photographs, Arnaout’s citizenship papers, and a 
microphone from his son’s Nintendo game.99
All of the searches were conducted pursuant to an Attorney General Emergency 
Physical Search Authorization (“AGEPSA”) executed on December 14, 2001.  
Benevolence International’s lawyers were not permitted to review the AGEPSA that day, 
supposedly because it was a classified document.  In fact, Benevolence International’s 
95 See id.
96 See Benevolence International Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F.Supp.2d 935, 936 (N.D. Ill. 
2002).  
97 See id.
98 See BIF Complaint at ¶ 14.
99 See id. 
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lawyers were not permitted to even read the AGEPSA until January 25, 2002.100  When 
Benevolence International’s lawyers were finally permitted to review the AGEPSA, 
Benevolence International discovered that the government was operating under what 
Benevolence International believes is false information that Arnaout was actually “Samir 
Abdul Motaleb.”101
Benevolence International’s lawyers subsequently challenged what they 
characterized the government’s actions in “seizing the property, and blocking the 
property and activities, of a law-abiding faith -based charity engaged in critical 
humanitarian work, without a hearing, without meaningful notice or opportunity for a 
hearing, and without probable cause” as unconstitutional.102  Benevolence International’s 
Complaint asserted claims for relief for violations of procedural due process, substantive 
due process, taking without just compensation, and other First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment violations.103  On April 18, 2002, the government filed a motion to submit 
evidence in camera and ex parte with the Court in support of their position in the case.104
Subsequently, on April 29, 2002, the United States Attorney filed criminal 
charges against Benevolence International and Arnaout for “knowingly submitting false 
material declarations under oath” in Benevolence International’s civil proceeding against 
the government.105  The criminal charges were based on what the government maintained 
were false affidavits submitted by Benevolence International and Arnaout that 
“Benevolence International has never provided aid or support to people or organizations 
100 See BIF Complaint at ¶ 17.
101 See id.
102 BIF Complaint at ¶ 1.
103 See BIF Complaint at ¶¶ 35-60.
104 See Benevolence International Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F.Supp.2d. at 937. 
105 See id. 
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known to be engaged in violence, terrorist activities, or military operations of any 
nature.”106  The government then successfully moved to stay discovery in Benevolence 
International’s civil case against the government as a result of the criminal complaint 
against Benevolence International and Arnaout.107  Both the civil and criminal cases are 
currently pending before the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois.  
IV. Due Process and Ex Parte, In Camera Submissions of Evidence 
As explained above, one of the more controversial provisions of the USA 
PATRIOT Act is Title I, Section 106 that invokes the issue of property protection under 
the Fifth Amendment.  Section 106 greatly increases presidential authority over the 
property or assets of foreign persons or organizations by amending Section 203 of the 
International Emergency Powers Act, and permitting the submission of evidence in 
support of the government’s action to the court on an ex parte, in camera basis.108
Specifically, Section 106(c) provides: “[I]n any judicial review of a determination made 
under this section, if the determination was based on classified information (as defined in 
section 1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act109) such information may be 
submitted to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.  This subsection does not confer 
106 Id. at 937.
107 See id. at 941. 
108 See 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1977).  
109 See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C.A. App. 3-8, 1(a) (West 2003). 
Section 1(a) defines classified information as “any information, or material that has been 
determined by the United Stats Government pursuant to an Executive Order, statute, or 
regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security 
and any restricted data as defined in paragraph r. of Section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954.” Id. 
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or imply any right to judicial review.”110 The Attorney General explained the perceived 
need for this provision, stating that:
[l]aw enforcement must be able to ‘follow the money’ in order to identify 
and neutralize terrorist networks.  We need the capacity for more than a 
freeze.  We must be able to seize.  Consistent with the President’s action 
[seizing assets of identified groups and individuals allegedly associated 
with al-Qaeda], our proposal gives law enforcement the ability to seize 
their terrorist assets.111
However, it is well-established that both temporary and permanent aliens in the United 
States enjoy a Fifth Amendment right to due process, a right that encompasses the right to 
hold personal and real property.  As a result, the proposition that the President may seize 
and dispose of such assets apparently without the benefit of the type of meaningful 
judicial review granted by the Fifth Amendment raises several questions.  
The PATRIOT Act does not completely strip individuals accused of providing 
material support to terrorists of any form of judicial review.  In fact, judicial review of 
asset blocking orders is available under Section 316(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
provides that owners of confiscated property may file federal lawsuits challenging the 
determination that the property was an asset of suspected terrorists.112  However, pursuant 
to Section 316(b), the Federal Rules of Evidence may be suspended if the court 
determines that compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence could jeopardize national 
110 Id.
111 Homeland Defense Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (Sept. 
25, 2001) (written testimony of the Honorable John Ashcroft, Attorney General), available at
<http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/print_testimony?id=108&wit_id=42>.
112 See USA PATRIOT Act § 316(a), 115 Stat. at 309.  Section 316(a) provides: “[a]n owner 
of property that is confiscated under any provision of law relating to the confiscation of assets of 
suspected international terrorists, may contest that confiscation by filing a claim in the manner set 
forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and asserting as an affirmative defense that –
(1) the property is not subject to confiscation under such provision of law; or
(2) the inocent owner provisions of section 983(d) of title 18, United States Code, apply 
to the case.”
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security interests.113  When faced with such a determination, the court is required to strike 
a delicate balance between the need to protect the sanctity of confidential information 
sources and the potential to undermine the right to a fair trial through a violation of the 
aggrieved party’s right to fundamental due process.  In each of the cases discussed in Part 
III, the court was required to make that determination.  An examination of the arguments, 
both for and against the use of such evidence, is particularly instructive as to the 
constitutionality of the use of secret evidence pursuant to Section 316(B) of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.  
A. Arguments Against the Use of Secret Evidence
The fundamental theory underlying the briefs submitted by the plaintiffs in the 
terrorist funding cases is that our adversarial system of jurisprudence requires that each 
side be permitted to present its own evidence and rebut the other party’s evidence through 
contrary evidence.114  However, the plaintiffs contend, that system is placed in jeopardy if 
one party is allowed to present secret in camera evidence that the other party is unable to 
examine, challenge and answer.115  The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the 
argument that the ability to confront and respond to evidence is a fundamental right of 
due process.  Thus, with regard to the use of secret evidence:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our 
jurisprudence.  One of these is that where governmental action seriously 
Id.  
113 See USA PATRIOT Act § 316(b), 115 Stat. at 309.  Section 316(b) provides: “in 
considering a claim filed under this section, a court may admit evidence that is otherwise 
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, if the court determines that the evidence is 
reliable, and that compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence may jeopardize the national 
security interests of the United States.” Id.
114 See BIF Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Submit Evidence In 
Camera and Ex Parte, Civ. No. 02-C-0763 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2002) (“BIF Memo in Opp.”), at p. 
10.
115 See id.
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injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact 
findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be 
disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is 
untrue.116
Perhaps not surprisingly, the plaintiffs in the terrorist-funding cases strenuously argue 
that the government’s attempt to submit evidence on an in camera, ex parte basis 
constitutes just such a violation of their fundamental rights to due process.  
One of the most persuasive cases in favor of the argument that the use of such 
evidence violates fundamental due process rights was set out in the briefs submitted on 
behalf of the plaintiff in Benevolence International.  In particular, counsel for 
Benevolence International argued that several prior courts had applied the basic 
principles of due process -- in the context of the government’s use of secret evidence to 
demonstrate the opposing party’s links to terrorism – and found that such evidence 
violated due process.  The fact that the government intended to argue that it was entitled 
to summary judgment on the basis of that secret evidence further compounded the 
problem.  “The government cannot,” Benevolence International’s lawyers argued, “be 
permitted to seize an American corporation’s assets indefinitely, never bring criminal or 
civil charges, and obtain dismissal of the corporation’s suit for return of its property by 
using “evidence” that the corporation cannot see or respond to.”117
Rather, under the application of the test set out in Mathews v. Eldridge,118 such an 
action would clearly violate the involved individuals’ fundamental due process rights.  
Under the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, the minimum 
requirements of due process include: (1) written notice of the specific charges against the 
116 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
117 BIF Memo in Opp. at pp. 15-16.
118 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).  
28
party; (2) disclosure to the party of the evidence against it; (3) an opportunity to be heard 
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront 
and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (6) if 
the hearing body rendered a decision adverse to the party, a written statement as to the 
evidence relied on and the basis for the decision.119  Benevolence International’s 
attorneys argued that the government clearly denied the charity a number of these 
fundamental due process requirements.  Benevolence International’s lawyers were 
particularly concerned that over four months were permitted to pass without Benevolence 
International being charged by the government with any offense.  
Finally, even if the Court were to permit the use of secret evidence, lawyers for 
the charities have argued that its use should be narrowly circumscribed to permit the 
government to conceal its sources but also permitting the accused individual or 
organization to learn the nature and contents of the evidence in question.120  Instead, the 
charities contend, the introduction of secret evidence should not alter substantive or 
procedural rules.121  If the government is permitted to rely on the submission of secret 
evidence in support of actions taken under the PATRIOT Act, the government should be 
required to file a Statement of Undisputed Facts with the court that would set out the facts 
that the government contends the secret evidence proves in summary form.122  Once such 
a submission is made to the court, the accused party will be able to evaluate all the 
evidence, as the law requires.123
119 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972).
120 See BIF Memo in Opp. at p. 16.  
121 See id. at 17 (citing In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ellsberg v.
Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
122 See id.
123 See id.
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The arguments set forth by the charities are not entirely unfounded.  As a number 
of lawyers who have litigated secret evidence cases in the past recently noted,124 there are 
a number of cases where such close scrutiny has permitted defense attorneys enough 
information to confront the evidence against their clients and ultimately to cause the 
government’s charges against those individuals to fall apart.125  The most notable of these 
cases involved Hany Kiareldeen, a Palestinian living in New Jersey who was detained 
after he was accused of meeting with one of the men convicted of bombing the World 
Trade Center in 1993.126  Upon closer examination of the “evidence” against him, 
Kiareldeen came to suspect that the main source of the secret evidence was his ex-wife, 
with whom he was involved in a bitter child-custody battle.127  When Kiareldeen brought 
these suspicions to the attention of the federal judge in charge of his case, the judge 
questioned both the government’s evidence against him and the process by which it was
presented.128  In particular, the court noted, it was concerned with “the integrity of the 
adversarial process, the impossibility of self-defense against undisclosed charges, and the 
reliability of government processes initiated and prosecuted in darkness.”129  As the 
Kiareldeen case makes clear, even the opportunity to confront the evidence against an 
individual in summary form can make a significant difference in the ability of an 
individual to overcome the “evidence” brought against them.  
124 Secret evidence was first sanctioned by Congress in 1996.  The most common venue for 
the use of secret evidence is certain immigration cases.  See Immigration and Nationality Act, 
Sec. 504(e)(3) (2003). Section 504(e)(3) provides that for the submission of “ex parte and in
camera evidence, any evidence for which the Attorney General determines that public disclosure 
would pose a risk to the national security of the United States or to the security of any individual 
because it would disclose classified information…” Id.
125 See Dougherty and Cohen, supra note 61.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id.
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C. Arguments in Favor of the Use of Secret Evidence
In response to the allegations raised by the charities in their lawsuits, the 
government set forth a number of arguments in support of the contention that in camera
and ex parte consideration of classified evidence is both statutorily authorized and 
constitutional.  First, the government noted, both FISA and IEEPA expressly authorize 
the Court’s acceptance of evidence on an ex parte, in camera basis.  While the IEEPA 
was amended by the PATRIOT Act to provide for the discretionary use of such evidence, 
FISA has provided for the use of such evidence on a mandatory basis since its 
enactment.130  Second, the government noted, the constitutionality of these provisions is 
not in dispute.  Courts have ruled on a number of occasions that ex parte, in camera
review of FISA materials is constitutional.131  Furthermore, while the charities’ argument 
about the potential difficulties arising from such a procedure is well-taken, Congress was 
fully aware of these potential difficulties and chose to resolve them through a method 
other than requiring that all such evidence be disclosed.132
Finally, the government noted, courts have routinely approved the use of ex parte 
classified information where, as here, national security concerns are implicated by the 
129 Id.
130 See BIF DEF.’S MEM. IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN CAMERA 
AND EX PARTE (“BIF DEF.’S MEM. IN SUPPORT”) at p. 5. FISA provides that in evaluating a 
challenge to a search conducted pursuant to FISA, the Court:
shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the Attorney general files an 
affidavit under oath that disclosure or any adversary hearing would harm the 
national security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the 
application, order, and such other materials relating to the physical search as may 
be necessary to determine whether the physical search of the aggrieved person 
was lawfully authorized and conducted.
See id. (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1825(g)).  As the government noted, in the twenty-four years 
following the enactment of FISA, no court has authorized the disclosure of FISA materials to a 
defendant.  See id.
131 See id. at p. 6.  
132 See id.
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nature of an alleged offense, or where Congress has specifically authorized the court to 
rely on such evidence.133  In the terrorist-funding cases, the government argued, national 
security concerns were paramount in light of the events of September 11 and the U.S. 
action in Afghanistan in reaction to those events.134  Congress was well aware of those 
national security interests when it passed the USA PATRIOT Act to expressly recognize 
the need for the government to utilize and rely on classified evidence under IEEPA.135
D. Balancing the Public Interest And Fundamental Due Process Rights 
The outrage and alarm expressed by critics of the PATRIOT Act’s authorization 
of the use of secret evidence might lead one to believe that courts faced with challenges 
to the Act’s constitutionality would overwhelmingly find in favor of the plaintiffs.  
Notably, however, the courts in the terrorist-funding cases have been reluctant to hold 
that ex parte, in camera submission of evidence by the government pursuant to Section 
316 of the PATRIOT Act violates fundamental due process rights.136
Some courts have declined to address the issue, choosing to resolve the lawsuits 
brought on behalf of the affected parties on other grounds.  For instance, Judge Kessler of 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found that the Holy Land Foundation 
for Relief and Development’s allegations about the use of secret evidence by the 
government in that case were “very significant and distressing.”137  At a preliminary 
hearing addressing the issue of the government’s intention to utilize Section 316 ex parte
evidence, Judge Kessler stated: “the government will have a heavy burden to convince 
me that they can submit material . . . ex parte . . . [I]n particular in a case with as many 
133 See id. at p. 7 (citing cases).
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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ramifications as this case, with as much public interest as has been demonstrated in this 
case, I . . . feel particularly strongly that unless the law [is] crystal clear . . . everything 
should be on the public record, so . . . that the public understands full well what we are 
doing and the reasons for what we are doing.”138  Ultimately, Judge Kessler refused to 
address the propriety of Section 316-type secret evidence, finding that it was not 
necessary to reach the issue in resolving the case.139
Other courts, however, have addressed the issue directly.  For instance, the Global 
Relief court admitted that such proceedings are extraordinary events in our judicial 
system because they deprive the parties against whom they are directed of the basic 
requirements of due process.140  The Global Relief plaintiffs based their due process 
claims on a theory that a party is guaranteed the right to confront the witness against 
them.  This right, which is provided by the Confirmation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment,141 is inapplicable to the terrorist financing cases because these cases do not 
involve criminal sanctions.  The parties also argued that they were deprived of notice 
setting out the alleged misconduct and an opportunity for a hearing.  Extraordinary events 
such in camera submissions of the type utilized by the government in Global Relief are 
clear violations of a party’s due process rights unless they are justified by compelling 
state interests.142   In such a situation, the court must carefully balance the government’s 
interest against those of the private party whose assets have been frozen.
137 See BIF Memo in Opp. at p. 15, n. 11 (discussing Judge Kessler’s remarks).  
138 See id. at p. 15, n. 11.
139 See Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 
n.3 (2002).  
140 See id.
141 See e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1974).
142 See id.
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Abiding by this mandate, the Global Relief court appropriately found that the 
government sufficiently demonstrated that it would harm the national security of the 
United States to disclose the evidence the government sought to submit ex parte and in 
camera in support of freezing the charity’s assets while the government’s investigation 
was pending.143  Further, the government had attempted to compensate for its inability to 
disclose certain portions of the evidence against the charity by publicly filing four binders 
of exhibits.144  The government’s confidentiality interest was particularly compelling 
because the case involved the freezing of funds and examination of seized potential 
evidence to further aid in the investigation.145
As demonstrated by the Global Relief court’s analysis, perhaps the most important 
procedural safeguard justifying the government’s ability to submit evidence ex parte and 
in camera is the court itself.  Specifically, the unbiased judiciary is a tremendous asset to 
an affected party when combating ex parte, in camera evidence submissions by the 
government.  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”146  As our 
government’s most vigorous defenders of the Constitution, courts are tasked with 
upholding the Fifth Amendment and ensuring that an affected party’s due process rights 
remain intact.147  The mere submission of “secret” evidence in support of the 
143 See id.
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
147 For instance, U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Edmunds – in a decision that is being 
hailed as a “positive step in thwarting the government’s post-September 11 transgressions” –
recently ruled that Muslim leader (and Global Relief co-founder) Rabih Haddad’s immigration 
hearings must remain open to the public.  See A Phyrric Victory: Haddad Ruling Begins 
Challenging Patriot Act, April 8, 2002, available at http://www.michigandaily.com.   Typically, 
immigration hearings remain open to the public, but following the enactment of the PATRIOT 
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government’s position does not prove the government’s argument automatically.  Rather, 
as finder of fact in an action challenging an asset blocking order, the court must weigh 
the government’s evidence supporting the decision and determine the sufficiency of such 
evidence.  Furthermore, the court is loath to proceed without providing a party the right 
to confront the evidence against them, and will act to ensure that any non-classified 
evidence is produced to that party.  In fact, the Global Relief court acted early in the 
litigation to ensure that all documents of a non-classified nature were either provided or 
returned to Global Relief on an on-going basis.148
Conclusion
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 resulted in an intense focus on money 
laundering as a source of terrorist funding.  As a result of this attention, new legislation 
was enacted to increase government authorities’ ability to combat such money laundering 
efforts.  While this new legislation resulted in a necessary increase in governmental 
enforcement capabilities, some critics question whether some of the provisions of these 
new laws may have potentially dangerous ramifications for our judicial process.  The 
continued use of ex parte, in camera evidence as a part of judicial proceedings 
challenging blocking orders pursuant to Section 316 of the USA PATRIOT Act has 
drawn attention as one of the potentially dangerous ramifications of such a course of 
action.  However, while the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act relating to the 
submission of in camera, ex parte evidence in support of the government’s allegations 
Act the government instructed all immigration judges to close hearings that are part of the 
government’s ongoing terrorist investigations.  See id.  After evaluating the government’s 
argument in favor of closing the hearing, Judge Edmunds found that the failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of any specific security concerns warranting such an action.  See id.
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are alarming at first glance, it appears that the ultimate goal of combating money 
laundering as an increasingly potent source of terrorist financing can and will only be 
accomplished through the broad enforcement capabilities provided by the USA 
PATRIOT Act held in check by the unbiased members of the judiciary.  
148 See Global Relief, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 805 (“the issue of Global Relief being denied access 
to its own documents has been addressed by the Court and [the government has] been returning 
documents to Global Relief on an on going basis.”).  
